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1 Introduction
Complex pricing structures and price menus are a typical phenomenon of today’s
business practices. Indeed, advances in information technology and its applications
(internet, social media, etc.) enable firms to know more and more about their con-
sumers, and speed up the trend toward more targeted offers and personalized pric-
ing strategies. At the same time, however, consumers appear to find it increasingly
difficult – even despite such services as price comparison websites on the internet –
to compare all relevant information to make their purchase decisions. As a result,
complex pricing practices have called the attention of authorities and consumer pro-
tection agencies that aim to ensure that consumers do not get lost in the wide array
of offers.
In this paper, we study the regulation of complex pricing schemes (in particular,
two-part tariffs) and its implications for consumer and social welfare. Building on
the contributions by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Armstrong and Vickers (2012)
and the literature that followed we develop a market model in which consumers do
not take all relevant price components into account. In contrast to existing models,
we focus on two-part tariffs where consumers are only imperfectly informed about
the linear price component. Within this setting, we consider different regulatory
interventions that limit firms’ ability to set prices and/or their ability to price dis-
criminate between consumers.
Examples for industries in which these tariffs are widespread, and in which con-
sumers are only imperfectly informed are mobile telecommunications (flat rate,
roaming charges), media markets (subscription price, per-view price), and gas and
electricity contracts (fixed monthly/yearly price, price per usage). Yet, in many of
these markets, some contract details are less salient than others, and not all price
component are taken into account by consumers.
A prime example of the kind of the market we have in mind (and in which reg-
ulators have taken action) is that of roaming fees in telecommunication markets.
An interesting aspect in this market is that consumers appear to be unaware of their
contract details with regard to roaming. As Oxera point out, “[c]onsumers typically
purchase roaming within a bundle that also contains domestic calls, texts and data
usage. However, there is generally little awareness of roaming charges [...].”1 In
a similar vein, a study by the European Commission in 2014 (“E-Communications
and Telecom Single Market Household Survey”) revealed that to be on the safe side,
a large share of users switched off their mobile phones when they traveled abroad,
because they were unaware of the costs involved. In this market, the simplification
of tariff structures was prominently featured in the European Commission’s goal to
reduce and abolish roaming tariffs in 2017.
1Oxera, Agenda, October 2014: “A Connected Continent? Eliminating excessive roaming charges
in the EU”, p. 1.
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Our paper aims to contribute to understanding the effects of such interventions.
This is particularly important, because economists worried about potential draw-
backs via waterbed effects, such that lower roaming charges might lead to higher
subscription prices (e.g., Duso, 2017; Sutherland, 2010). Oxera points out that rev-
enue generated by roaming within the European Union accounted for an average of
4.2% of total mobile revenues across the European Union in 2009. Therefore, they
conclude that “some attempt to protect revenue cannot be ruled out” (p. 4).2
The paper discusses under which circumstances such adverse waterbed effects might
arise, and it analyzes their relationship to market transparency. Moreover, our re-
sults shed light on why the European Commission’s and mobile operators’ interests
are misaligned with regard to the necessity of such a policy intervention.
To study markets with complex pricing schemes in which consumers are not tak-
ing all relevant information into account, we develop a duopoly model with firms
competing for consumers in a differentiated product market. Each consumer has
a downward-sloping demand function, and firms can potentially offer a menu of
two-part tariffs. Motivated by the above example of roaming and building on the
behavioral industrial organization literature (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Heidhues
and Kőszegi, 2018), we incorporate the aspect of transparency in our model: When
firms set two-part tariffs, a share of consumers (called uninformed consumers) are
only aware of the fixed price component. As a consequence, these consumers ne-
glect the linear price when they decide which firm to buy from. At a later con-
sumption stage, however, these consumers have also learnt about the linear price,
and they choose the consumption quantity accordingly. In contrast, informed con-
sumers are fully aware of the firms’ tariffs at all stages of the game.
Within this setting, we analyze various (potentially) complex pricing schemes. In
our base version, firms offer a menu of two-part tariffs. These screening tariffs are
designed so that informed and uninformed consumers self-select into different con-
tracts. Informed consumers choose a contract with a high fixed fee and a low linear
price, whereas uninformed consumers are attracted by a contract that offers a low
fixed fee, but has a high linear fee (which is overlooked by uninformed consumers
when choosing the contract). Interestingly, all contracts are inefficient, because the
linear price exceeds marginal cost; informed consumers are better off than unin-
formed consumers.
As pointed out before, complex pricing schemes and consumer awareness have
gained prominence in policy discussions. In the competition-policy debate, reg-
ulators and consumer protection agencies typically follow two approaches to in-
crease the comparability of different offers: education and simplification. When
consumers learn to find out about contract pitfalls, they may make more educated
2There are a couple of contributions investigating the previous regulation on wholesale and retail
roaming fees from 2007 (see, for instance, Ambjørnsen et al., 2011). Moreover, Genakos and Valletti
(2011, 2012) empirically identify waterbed effects in mobile telecommunication markets when inter-
connection charges are reduced.
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purchase decisions. The same is true when firms are obliged to reduce the com-
plexity of their pricing structures. Both policies can potentially result in an increased
market transparency. We analyze two policy interventions that restrict firms’ choice
of pricing schemes: i) reducing the range of contracts so that firms compete in sin-
gle two-part tariffs and ii) abolishing linear fees so that firms compete in fixed-fee
contracts (as in the EU roaming regulation).
These interventions can also be understood in the extent to which firms are able to
price discriminate. In our base version with a menu of two-part tariffs, firms can
price discriminate intra-group (two-part tariff) but also inter-group (informed vs.
uninformed consumers). The first intervention only bans inter-group price discrim-
ination. The second intervention essentially bans both types of price discrimination,
because with a single price instrument (the fixed price component), firms can no
longer design self-selecting contracts.
The first intervention that only prohibits inter-group price discrimination is interest-
ing in itself, because it can be viewed as an extension to the prominent framework
developed in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). In contrast to their model and the lit-
erature that followed, add-on prices are only overlooked at the contracting stage,
but are optimally accounted for in a subsequent consumption stage in our frame-
work. We characterize the single equilibrium two-part tariff, and find that it de-
pends on the shares of the two consumer types. Interestingly, whereas the linear
price is strictly decreasing with the share of informed consumers, there exists a
non-monotone relationship between the degree of transparency (as measured by
the share of informed consumers) and both the fixed price component and profits.
This is different from previous results with linear or fixed fees only (see the related
literature below): In those cases, an increase in transparency, i.e., a larger share
of consumers become informed about the prices set by the firms, always increases
competition, and, hence, results in lower fixed fees and lower profits. In contrast,
our results suggest that the extent of possible waterbed effects crucially depends on
the degree of market transparency, and is only significant in situations with many
informed consumers.
The fact that a change in the degree of transparency has ambiguous effects on profits
under two-part tariffs is due to the relative strength of two opposing effects: On the
one hand, more informed consumers imply that the linear price decreases so that
firms focus more on the fixed fee to earn profits. This effect tends to increase the
fixed fee with more transparency. On the other hand, informed consumer are more
sensitive to changes in the fixed fee than uninformed consumers. This competition
effect puts downward pressure on fixed fees. However, this effect becomes weaker
as transparency increases. As a result, we find a u-shaped relationship so that fixed
fees and profits first decrease, and then increase in the degree of transparency. Re-
lated to this, there is also a non-monotone relationship between the degree of trans-
parency and consumer surplus under these tariffs, but in the opposite direction. In
4
particular, we show that for low and intermediate shares of informed consumers,
simplifying the pricing structure increases consumer surplus. However, consumer
surplus can decrease if a larger number of consumers is informed.
Consistent with the idea that regulation removes the opportunity to earn large prof-
its from uninformed consumers, firm profit falls, and overall consumer surplus
rises. Yet, there can be opposing effects on different consumer types. Whereas un-
informed consumers always benefit from regulation, informed consumers can be
worse off.
The second intervention prohibits linear fees (and, hence, any form of price dis-
crimination) so that firms offer only a single contract at a fixed price. This contract
does not depend on the shares of the consumer types. Compared to the base case
with screening contracts, we find that consumers and firms are typically affected in
opposite directions. When firms set fixed prices only, in models with only informed
consumers, this necessarily increases firm profits, and hurts consumers (Gössl and
Rasch, 2020). In our model with uninformed consumers, this may no longer hold,
and firms may lose and consumers benefit if the market is sufficiently opaque (that
is, the share of uninformed consumers is sufficiently large). Interestingly, however,
uninformed consumers always benefit from the intervention, whereas informed
consumer always lose out. Thus, the overall effects on firm profits and consumer
welfare are driven by the group composition, and banning price discrimination can
hurt firms, because it lowers their opportunities to exploit uninformed consumers.
Given that both interventions that we consider can be beneficial for consumers, it
appears essential to identify which intervention fares better. We find that – depend-
ing on the parameterization of the model – both interventions can be the optimal
choice of a regulator interested in promoting consumer surplus. The regulation
toward a single two-part tariff is the better intervention for high levels of trans-
parency, whereas a regime with fixed fees only provides a larger surplus to con-
sumers if transparency is relatively low. If a regulator – apart from choosing the
pricing regime – can influence consumer awareness (that is, via disclosure), a reg-
ulator intending to maximize (total) consumer surplus would opt for a single two-
part tariff with an intermediate level of transparency.
Related literature
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature
on behavioral industrial organization and add-on pricing. Second, we contribute to
the literature on competitive price discrimination (in particular, two-part tariffs) in
differentiated product markets.
We add to the growing literature on behavioral industrial organization that studies
market outcomes in the presence of behaviorally biased consumers.3 Within this
3For a survey, see, for instance, Grubb (2015b) and Heidhues and Kőszegi (2018).
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literature, our paper is related to studies on add-on pricing where consumers do
not take into account the prices of additional products or services (parking, minibar,
luggage, etc.) when making a purchase decision (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson, 2006;
Armstrong and Vickers, 2012; Grubb, 2015a; Heidhues et al., 2017). We extend this
literature with regard to three aspects. First, this literature typically considers a
binary purchase decision of the add-on, whereas in our setting, individual add-on
demand depends on the price. Second, in our model, consumers are only unaware
of one (linear) price component at the contract stage (when deciding where to buy),
but are completely informed when making quantity choices about the add-on. This
is consistent with the idea that, at some point, consumers become fully informed
about the contract details, and can adjust their consumption behaviour. Third, our
setting allows to explore different pricing scenarios (with intra- and inter-group
price discrimination), and to analyze the welfare effects on market participants.
There is also an older literature on consumer-side market transparency assuming
that an exogenously given share of consumers is uninformed about prices, and se-
lects randomly among competing firms.4 In contrast, consumers in our model can
observe some, but not all price elements. The focus of these papers is also different,
though. For example, these contributions analyze firms’ ability to maintain collu-
sion as the degree of transparency changes (Schultz, 2005, 2017; Rasch and Herre,
2013) and the scope of market entry for varying degrees of market transparency
(Schultz, 2009; Gu and Wenzel, 2011).
We also contribute to the literature on competitive price discrimination in differenti-
ated product markets (e.g., Armstrong and Vickers, 2001). Surveys are provided by
Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007). As in Yin (2004) and Gössl and Rasch (2020),
we compare different pricing scenarios (two-part tariffs, only fixed prices). But, in
contrast to the literature, we study a setting in which consumers are only partially
informed about relevant price components. This makes it possible to study the ef-
fect of banning only inter-group price discrimination (firms can offer only a single
two-part tariff) and situations in which both inter- and intra-group price discrimi-
nation are banned (firms can only offer a tariff with a fixed price, but no linear price
component).
As in our study, a couple of recent papers investigate two-part prices or screen-
ing contracts with behaviorally biased consumers. For instance, Eliaz and Spiegler
(2006) show how a monopolist can screen consumers who differ in their degree
of naiveté. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010) analyze a credit card market in which
consumers differ in their beliefs about time-consistent behavior. Related to add-on
pricing, Heidhues et al. (2017) consider a setting in which firms screen consumers
by offering an inferior product (with a high add-on price) to naive consumers and
a superior product to sophisticated consumers. Herweg and Mierendorff (2013)
4See, for instance, (Varian, 1980) for a setting with homogeneous products and Schultz (2005) for
a model with differentiated products.
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study a setting in which consumers are loss-averse, and derive conditions under
which firms offer a flat-rate tariff (that is, a contract with a zero linear price). Hei-
dhues and Kőszegi (2017) study the effects of price discrimination if firms have
information about consumer naiveté.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3 derives
the equilibrium when firms can offer multiple two-part contracts to consumers. Sec-
tions 4 and 5 analyze the outcomes when, due to policy interventions, firms are re-
stricted in the type of contracts they can offer (either a single two-part contract or
fixed-fee contracts). We compare the implications for firm profits, consumer sur-
plus, and social welfare in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of horizontal product differentiation with two symmetric firms,
i ∈ {1, 2}, located at opposite ends of a unit line (Hotelling, 1929). Fixed and
marginal costs are normalized to zero. Depending on the pricing scenario con-
sidered (which will be explained later in more detail), firm i can offer a two-part
contract with a fixed price fi and a linear price pi that must be paid for every unit
purchased.
A unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed along the unit line. There are two
types of consumers, informed and uninformed. The share of informed consumers
is φ, and the share of uninformed consumers is 1−φ. These shares are the same for
all locations x ∈ [0, 1] on the unit line. The two groups differ in their information
status j with regard to the firms’ pricing policy. We denote informed consumers by
j = r; uninformed consumers are denoted by j = n. (The details will be explained
below.) Firms cannot distinguish between the different consumer types, i.e., firms
cannot use third-degree price discrimination.
In contrast to a standard Hotelling model, we allow the quantity demanded by an
individual consumer to depend on the price. A consumer who is located at x, and
who purchases quantity q ∈ [0, 1] units receives the following utility when buying
from firm i:
ui(x; q; fi, pi) = q −
q2
2
− q (pi + τ |Li − x|)− fi, (1)
where τ is the transport-cost parameter, pi is the linear price, and fi is the fixed price.
The location of firm i is Li.5
This formulation follows the approach in Yin (2004). We use a shipping model in
which consumers incur (linear) transport costs per unit consumed.6 This implies
5Note that we could add a fixed value for basic services (e.g., for domestic calls and internet
services in the roaming example). For reasons of tractability, we normalize the valuation for such
services to zero.
6Our linear demand specification is a simplified version of that in Section 3.2 of Yin (2004) which
7
that mismatch costs occur for each unit purchased, and qτ |Li − x| represents the
total disutility suffered by a consumer with preferred product characteristicsxwhen
consuming a product that is not ideal (and, hence, not located at x, but at Li).
Consumer decision making proceeds in two stages. In a first step (the contracting
stage), consumers decide where to buy. In a second step (the consumption stage),
consumers decide about the quantity to be consumed at the chosen firm. At the
consumption stage, a consumer chooses quantity q so as to maximize utility from
consumption (equation (1)). This implies that the demand of a consumer located
at x who buys at firm i takes the following linear form:
qi(x; pi) = 1− pi − τ |Li − x|. (2)
At the contracting stage, the two consumer groups differ in the extent to which they
take into account price information when deciding between the firms’ contracts. An
informed consumer (j = r) takes into account any price component charged by the
two firms. In contrast, an uninformed consumer (j = n) is aware of the fixed fees
charged by the firms, but neglects the linear prices, and expects both firms to set a
linear price of zero when selecting a firm.7 Hence, a consumer of type j (at location
x) expects to consume the following quantities:
qji (x; pi) = 1− 1rpi − τ |Li − x|, (3)
where
1r(j) =
1 if j = r,0 if j = n.
Note that for an informed consumer (j = r), the expected and actual consumed
quantities coincide, that is, expressions (2) and (3) are identical. In contrast, for an
uninformed consumer, expected and actual demand diverge. Indeed, by neglect-
ing the linear price element, an uninformed consumer expects to consume a higher
quantity than is optimally chosen later on.
Given expected demand levels, a consumer with information status j who is located
at x, and who expects to purchase qji (x; pi) anticipates the following utility when
is also used in Gössl and Rasch (2020). The shipping model allows us to derive tractable results,
and fits to the market we have in mind. An alternative approach to introducing elastic demand in a
Hotelling framework is to consider a setting in which the transport costs are incurred independently
of the consumption volume. This approach is taken, for instance, in Armstrong and Vickers (2001) in
the context of price discrimination and in Gu and Wenzel (2009) in the context of firm entry.
7We note that the results of our analysis do not depend on the assumption that uninformed expect
both firms to have zero marginal prices. The same results would occur if consumers expect both firms
to charge the same positive linear fee. What is important for our results is only that uninformed
consumers are not responsive to linear fees at the contracting stage.
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choosing firm i at the contracting stage:






− qji (x; pi) (1rpi + τ |Li − x|)− fi.
Again, expected and actual utility levels coincide for an informed consumer, but
an uninformed consumer expects a higher utility level from choosing a supplier. It
should be noted that in this respect, our setup differs from existing models. In our
setting, there is only a distortion in contract choice, but behavior is optimal in the
consumption stage (once contracts have been chosen). This is different from exist-
ing contributions. For instance, in Gabaix and Laibson (2006), a share of consumers
may opt for an overpriced add-on product even if there is a cheaper outside oppor-
tunity available. Similarly, in Heidhues et al. (2017), a consumer may purchase a
product even if the price exceeds the valuation. In contrast, in our approach, all
consumers eventually learn about all price components, and their actual purchase
decisions are optimal ex-post.
Throughout the paper, we focus on situations in which the market is fully covered,
i.e., each consumer buys at either firm 1 or firm 2, and in which firms would like to
serve both types of consumers. This imposes restrictions on the admissible range
of transport costs. On the one hand, transport costs must not be too large because
otherwise some of the consumers prefer not to buy from any firm. On the other
hand, when transport costs are very low, catering only to the uninformed or in-
formed consumers may be optimal for the firms. The corresponding restrictions
are summarized in Assumption 1 (and derived in the Appendix):8
Assumption 1.








The timing of events is as follows:
Stage 1 (Pricing stage) Both firms simultaneously set their prices. Depending on
the regime, firms may charge (i) a menu of two-part tariffs, (ii) a single two-
part tariff, (iii) only a fixed fee.
Stage 2 (Contracting stage) Consumers observe firms’ pricing decisions, and de-
cide which contract to choose. Informed consumers consider all price ele-
ments, while uninformed consumers ignore linear price elements.
Stage 3 (Consumption stage) Uninformed consumers learn the linear price, and
all consumers choose their consumption level. Firm profits and consumer sur-
plus materialize.
8The assumption is written in terms of the transport-cost parameter τ . Of course, it could also be
given in terms of the share of informed consumers φ (see the figures below).
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Next, we solve for the subgame perfect equilibria of the various pricing scenarios.
3 Competition with screening contracts
We start by considering the case in which firms can offer two different two-part
contracts aimed at screening informed and uninformed consumers. This scenario
serves as our benchmark. We will later evaluate it against two policy measures: One
intervention bans the linear price element, and requires firms to charge a fixed fee
only. In a second intervention, a regulator bans multiple tariffs, and requires firms
to offer a single contract (which can be a two-part tariff) to all consumers.
In the final stage (the consumption stage), all consumers (informed and uninformed)
are fully aware of the pricing details of the chosen contract. As a result, the actual
demand of every consumer is given by expression (2). However, when deciding
from which firm to buy in the second stage, the uninformed agents are unaware of
the linear component leading to a type-dependent location for the indifferent con-








x̃j ; qj2; p2, f2
)
. (4)




− 1r (p1 − p2)
2τ
− f1 − f2
τ(2− 1r (p1 + p2)− τ)
. (5)
Note from equation (5) that informed and uninformed consumers differ in their
responsiveness to changes in the fixed component fi: Demand by informed con-
sumers is more sensitive to changes in the fixed fee than demand by uninformed
consumers. Moreover, this responsiveness of informed consumers also increases
with the linear price. This is due to the fact that informed consumers anticipate that
their benefit from usage is low for relatively high linear prices. In this case, even
small differences in the fixed fees translate into relatively large differences in utility
from the two firms, increasing informed consumers’ sensitivity to changes in the
fixed fee.
Firms set their prices anticipating the type-dependent indifference levels and the
fact that both types of consumers choose the same quantity after having learned pi.
Assume that x̃j ∈ [0, 1]. Then, firm i’s maximization problem is given by
max
(pi,n,fi,n),(pi,r,fi,r)














(1− pi,n − τ |Li − x|)dx+ fi,nx̃n
)
subject to consumers choosing the intended contract:
uri (x; q; fi,r, pi,r) ≥ uri (x; q; fi,n, pi,n),
uni (x; q; fi,n, pi,n) ≥ uni (x; q; fi,r, pi,r).
The maximization problem allows firms to offer possibly different contracts to in-
formed (pi,r, fi,r) and uninformed consumers (pi,n, fi,n). Because consumer types
are not observable, firms have to ensure that each type chooses the intended con-
tract. Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium contracts offered to the two consumer
types (where the subscript S refers to screening contracts).
Proposition 1. When firms can offer multiple two-part tariffs, firms will design dif-
ferent contracts for informed and uninformed consumers. The contract designed








The contract designed for an uninformed consumer is
f∗S,n (τ) = −
16− 80τ + 35τ2
64




In equilibrium each firm earns profits of
π∗S (φ, τ) =
τ (4(9− φ)− τ(17 + 5φ))
64
.
Consumer welfare and social welfare amount to




























Ψ∗S (φ, τ) = Λ
∗
S(φ, τ) + 2π
∗
S(φ, τ).
The proposition shows that firms can successfully segment the market by offering
different contracts to informed and uninformed consumers. The contract for the
uninformed consumers has a lower fixed component and a higher linear price com-
ponent than the contract for informed consumers. This price structure is attractive
for an uninformed consumer, because he ignores the linear price, and only consid-
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ers the fixed price element. In contrast, informed consumers are willing to pay a
higher fixed fee to benefit from a lower linear price (and, hence, a higher consump-
tion quantity).9
We note that the contracts offered to both types of consumers are inefficient, be-
cause the linear price exceed the marginal costs (normalized to zero). Given the
higher linear price for uninformed consumers (and, hence, the larger distortion), it
is clear that social welfare strictly increases as the share of uninformed consumers
decreases.
It is interesting to look at the effect of the transportation costs on equilibrium prices.
While for informed consumers, both price elements increase as transportation costs
increase, this is not the case for uninformed consumers. Here, the fixed price in-
creases, but the linear component decreases. The reason is that with a higher trans-
portation cost, firms’ revenues from linear sales are decreasing, which means that
there is less incentive to attract uninformed consumers via a low fixed component.
The pricing structure toward uninformed consumers is reminiscent of other mod-
els in which consumers are unaware of add-on fees or other price elements, and in
which this lack of awareness results in high prices for unobserved and low prices
for observed price elements (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Armstrong and Vick-
ers, 2012). We note that the firms may charge a negative fixed fee to uninformed
consumers if transport costs are sufficiently small (τ < 8/7 − 4
√
65/35). In such
cases, firms find it worthwhile to subsidize so as to attract uninformed consumers
via a give-away (negative fixed fee), and recoup the losses with a high linear price.
4 Reducing the range of contracts: Competition in single
two-part tariffs
We now analyze the effects of a regulatory intervention that reduces the range of
contracts so that firms can only offer one single contract. This contract can be a
two-part tariff. As a result of this policy, firms can only exercise intra-group price
discrimination, but cannot price discriminate between informed and uninformed
consumers. Nevertheless, as we will show below, the presence of both consumer
types shapes the design of the equilibrium contract.
Equilibrium behaviour
As in Section 3, firms set their prices anticipating the type-dependent indifference
levels and the fact that both types of consumers choose the same quantity after hav-
9The contract for informed consumers corresponds to the benchmark cases (with only informed
consumers) as analyzed in Yin (2004) and Gössl and Rasch (2020). We note that the same equilibrium
contracts would emerge if firms could observe consumers’ type, and could engage in third-degree
price discrimination.
12
ing learned pi, but are now restricted to offer the same contract to both consumer
















(1− pi − τ |Li − x|)dx+ fix̃n
)
,




τ2 (−23φ2 + 18φ+ 9) + 8τ (10φ2 − 9φ− 3)− 64φ2 + 64φ+ 16
gives the following equilibrium result (where the subscript T denotes the case with
single two-part tariffs):
Proposition 2. When each firm sets a single two-part tariff, the symmetric equilib-
rium tariffs depend on the share φ of informed consumers, and are given by
p∗T (φ, τ) =
12− τ(5− 3φ)−A− 8φ
16(1− φ)
and
f∗T (φ, τ) =
(A+ τ(5φ− 3)− 8φ+ 4)
256(1− φ)2(A− 3τ(φ+ 1) + 8φ+ 4)
(
A2 + 2A(−3τφ+ τ + 8φ− 4)
− 143τ2 + (8− 3τ)2φ2 + 2(τ(61τ − 108)− 32)φ+ 312τ − 48) .
The equilibrium profit for each firm is
π∗T (φ, τ) =
τ
(
φ(A+ 13τ − 12)− 8(A+ 3τ − 4) + (8− 3τ)φ2
)
128(φ− 1)φ .
Given symmetric equilibrium prices, consumer surplus is calculated as10




u (x; q; p∗T (φ, τ), f
∗
T (φ, τ)) dx,
and social welfare is
Ψ∗T (φ, τ) = Λ
∗
T (φ, τ) + 2π
∗
T (φ, τ).
Note that in this scenario in which firms have to offer the same contract to all con-
sumers, both groups of consumers do not differ with respect to their surplus (as was
10We do not present formal expressions here due to readability, but illustrate our findings below.
Details are available from the authors upon request.
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the case with screening contracts), i.e., the share of partially informed consumers
has no direct effect on total consumer surplus. It has, however, an indirect effect
via firms’ pricing decisions. This is different in existing approaches: For example,
in Gabaix and Laibson (2006), the consumer types also make different decisions in
equilibrium, whereas in our model, both types consume the same quantity in equi-
librium. In our setting, the existence of the two groups only has an indirect effect
via influencing the firms’ pricing strategies (which then affect both consumer types
in the same way).
Impact of transparency
Before comparing the equilibrium outcome with the one under screening, and be-
fore evaluating the policy effects, it is useful to closely inspect how the presence of
the two consumer groups affects firms’ pricing strategies and the equilibrium out-
comes. The analysis is useful for understanding interventions that increase market
transparency (for instance, via disclosure requirements and education initiatives).
The following proposition describes the effects of an increase of the share of in-
formed consumers on equilibrium contracts:
Proposition 3. An increase in consumer transparency (as measured by the share of
informed consumers) has the following effects on firms’ equilibrium pricing strate-
gies:
(i) It holds that ∂p∗T /∂φ < 0.
(ii) There exists a φf∗T (τ) such that ∂f∗T /∂φ < 0 for φ < φf∗T (τ), and ∂f∗T /∂φ > 0
for φ > φf∗T (τ).
The existence of uninformed consumers in the market changes firms’ equilibrium
prices. Part (i) of the proposition shows that the linear price component decreases
in the share of the informed consumers. In contrast, part (ii) shows that there is a
non-monotonic effect on the fixed fee.
The effect on the linear price follows from a larger number of consumers considering
this price component when choosing where to buy. Clearly, the more consumers
are informed about the linear price at the contracting stage, the lower the price that
firms have to set.
The non-monotonic effect of transparency on the fixed fee component is due to two
opposing effects: a direct effect and an indirect effect. The direct effect is a compo-
sition effect, and the indirect effect works via the decrease of the linear price com-
ponent as market transparency increases. The effects can be seen in the first-order
14
















direct effect: composition effect
(f1 + p
∗
T (φ)(1− p∗T − τx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect: decreases with φ
) = 0.
The indirect effect follows from the decrease of the linear price component. With
lower linear prices, informed consumers become less sensitive toward changes in
the fixed fee. Hence, as the linear price decreases with more informed consumers,
firms have larger incentives to increase the fixed fee. This effect is similar in spirit
to an increase in the transportation-cost parameter in a standard Hotelling model.
Because the linear price decreases with more informed consumers, consumption
quantities increase (and, hence, consumption becomes more efficient). While con-
sumers benefit from this effect, firm profits originating from the linear price com-
ponent decrease. The lower profit reduces the intensity of competition among firms
for new consumers via lower fixed fees, which enables them to charge higher fixed
fees. This effect is similar to the cross-subsidization effects in the add-on literature
(e.g., Gabaix and Laibson, 2006).
The direct effect is a composition effect. As noted earlier (see equation (5)), in-
formed consumers are more sensitive to changes in the fixed fee than uninformed
consumers. Hence, as the share of informed consumers increases, market demand
becomes more elastic regarding the fixed fee forcing firms to reduce this fee. How-
ever, this effect becomes weaker as transparency increases. This effect can best be
understood by looking at the cross-derivative of the marginal informed consumer




τ(2− 2p− τ)2 < 0.
Due to the two opposing effects, the overall effect of increased market transparency
is u-shaped in the level of transparency. As part (ii) of Proposition 3 shows, the
fixed fee first decreases for low values of the share of informed consumers and then
increases for high values of the share of informed consumers. This is shown in
Figure 1. The left panel illustrates the result for a given value of the transport-cost
parameter, whereas the right panel shows the effects of changes in the transport-cost
parameter. Moreover, the right panel also displays the parameter regions in which
profits and consumer surplus increase or decrease if transparency is increased.
This non-monotonicity can also be illustrated by considering a regulation that low-
ers the linear price component directly (instead of indirectly via a larger number of
informed consumers). In a version of our model in which firms set the linear fee at
a regulated level of p̄, and in which firms compete on the fixed fee, we can show the
following result:
15
Corollary 1. Suppose that firms compete in a single two-part tariff and a regulator
fixes the linear price at p̄. Then, decreasing p̄ leads to lower (higher) fixed fees for
sufficiently high (low) values of p̄.
This corollary relates our findings to the discussion of waterbed or see-saw effects,
according to which the regulation of one price component may lead to the increase
of other price components (e.g., Genakos and Valletti, 2011, 2012).11 Our analysis
brings a more nuanced picture forward, and suggests that the extent of such wa-
terbed effects depends on consumer awareness. The corollary suggests that such
adverse waterbed effects of regulation are non-monotonic. Starting from high lev-
els of p̄, a reduction in the linear fee also leads to a lower fixed fee. In contrast, if p̄
is already at a low level, a further decrease of the linear fee may lead to a waterbed
effect and, hence, a higher fixed fee.
The next proposition explores the welfare and profit implications of more trans-
parency:
Proposition 4. An increase in consumer transparency (as measured by the share of
informed consumers) has the following effects on welfare and firm profits:
(i) It holds that ∂Ψ∗T /∂φ > 0.
(ii) There exists a φπ∗T (τ) such that ∂π∗T /∂φ < 0 for φ < φπ∗T (τ), and ∂π∗T /∂φ > 0
for φ > φπ∗T (τ).
(iii) There exists a φΛ∗T (τ) such that ∂Λ∗T /∂φ > 0 for φ < φΛ∗T (τ), and ∂Λ∗T /∂φ < 0
for φ > φΛ∗T (τ).
Because the only inefficiency in the market arises from a linear price which is set
above the marginal cost of zero, we can immediately conclude that social welfare
decreases as the share of informed consumers increases due to lower linear prices.
Social welfare is maximized when all consumers are perfectly informed, because
this means that the linear price is lowest.
Interestingly, as opposed to existing findings, the effects on firm profits and con-
sumer surplus are non-monotonic. These effects are illustrated in the right panel
of Figure 1. The u-shaped effect on firm profits follows the logic on firms’ pric-
ing strategies outlined in Proposition 3. When many consumers are initially unin-
formed, informing some of them leads to lower linear prices and lower fixed fees.
As a consequence, profits decrease. The picture changes when few consumers are
initially uninformed. In this case, the linear price decreases, but the increase in the
fixed price compensates this negative effect so that overall profits increase. Lastly,
11For instance, Genakos and Valletti (2011) find that a decrease of interconnection charge in mobile
telecommunication markets leads to an increase of subscription prices.
16








XXX (XXX) Complex pricing and consumer transparency March 4, 2020 12 / 14
(a) Impact on prices (τ = 1/4).
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(b) Impact on profits and welfare.
Figure 1: Impact of transparency, prices, profits, and welfare.
Note: The area between the solid gra lines in the rig t panel represents those combinations
of the degree of transparency and transport costs considered in the analysis.
we also point out that profits are highest when all consumers are uninformed about
linear prices, i.e., in particular, π∗T (1, τ) < π∗T (0, τ).
With regard to consumer surplus, note that the previous literature suggests that
consumers are affected most by the fixed fee (Gössl and Rasch, 2020). Because the
fixed fee first decreases and then increases as the market becomes more and more
transparent, this translates into the effect a change in transparency has on consumer
surplus: It first increases, and decreases for (very) high levels of consumer-side
transparency.
This last aspect also affects the optimal level of consumer transparency. From the
observation that consumer surplus decreases in the degree of transparency when
transparency is already high (see part (iii) of Proposition 4) and the fact that











= Λ∗T (1, τ),
we can state the following result:
Corollary 2. Under a consumer standard, the optimal level of transparency is given
by φΛ∗T (τ).
Implications of the policy intervention
We are now in a position to evaluate the effects of the policy intervention, that is,
the effect of banning multiple two-part tariffs. We start by comparing the effects on
prices.
17
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Figure 2: Impact of a policy that bans multiple two-part tariffs on prices.
Prices can be compared in Figure 2. The figure provides a comparison of prices
under the screening contracts (for both informed and uninformed consumers) and
the prices under a single two-part tariff. With regard to the linear price, the figure
shows that due to the intervention, the linear price will decrease for uninformed
consumers, but it will increase for informed consumers. More interestingly, because
the fixed fee is u-shaped in transparency (see our previous discussion), this price
component can decrease for both consumer segments.
Our next finding relates to firm profits:
Proposition 5. A reduction of the permissible number of two-part tariffs results in
lower profits for firms, i.e., π∗T < π∗S .
The proposition shows that firm profits necessarily decrease when firms can no
longer target uninformed consumers via a separate contract. Hence, losing the abil-
ity to price discriminate hurts firms.
Define the following critical level of transparency
φΛ∗ST,r (τ) =
(256 + 3232τ2 − 4000τ3 + 1101τ4 − (−4 + 3τ)(−4 + 7τ)2
√
16 + 8τ + 161τ2
2(256− 256τ + 2720τ2 − 3856τ3 + 1389τ4) .
The following proposition evaluates the welfare effects of the intervention:
Proposition 6. (i) Informed consumers are made better (worse) off by the reduc-
tion of the permissible number of two-part tariffs when their share is small
(large), i.e., Λ∗T,r > (<)Λ∗S,r for φ < (>)φΛ∗ST,r .
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(ii) Uninformed consumers always benefit from the reduction, i.e., Λ∗T,n > Λ∗S,n.
(iii) Consumers as a whole always benefit from the reduction, i.e., Λ∗T > Λ∗S .
(iv) Requiring a reduction of the permissible number of two-part tariffs always
increases social welfare, i.e., Ψ∗T > Ψ∗S .
The findings on firm profits and consumer welfare follow from the intuition that
this intervention removes the ability of firms to earn relatively large amounts from
targeting uninformed consumers via a separate contract. As a result, the market
becomes more competitive so that firm profits fall, and consumer surplus can rise.
Interestingly, however, while uninformed consumers always benefit, the effect is
ambiguous for informed consumers.
5 Abolishing linear fees: Competition in fixed-fee contracts
In this section, we consider the case in which firms are restricted to fixed-fee pricing,
and cannot make use of the linear price component. This means that both firms set a
linear price of zero.12 This intervention would correspond to the EU ban of roaming
charges in mobile telecommunication.
Notice that this intervention – apart from eliminating the linear price component –
reduces the range of possible contracts. With only a fixed fee, firms can no longer
design different contracts to screen informed and uninformed consumers. Hence,
this setting rules out any discrimination based on consumers’ information status
(inter-group price discrimination), but also bans intra-group price discrimination
(via a two-part tariff).
Equilibrium behaviour
Because consumer information does not matter in this scenario, our model simpli-
fies to the analysis in Gössl and Rasch (2020). From expression (2) it follows that
the local demand of a consumer at firm i is qi(x) = 1 − τ |Li − x|. Because there
is no linear price, the actual demand level coincides with the expected demand for
both consumer types at the contracting stage. Hence, the indifferent consumer x̃F
in both segments is given by:
u1(x̃; q1; f1) = u2(x̃; q2; f2)⇔ x̃F =
1
2
− f1 − f2
τ(2− τ) .
12Note that we have normalized marginal costs to zero. Hence, this policy could be regarded as
one that requires firms to price the linear component at cost.
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Firms now simultaneously maximize:
max
fi
πi,F (fi; fj) = fix̃F .
The following proposition describes equilibrium firm behaviour and the market
outcome:
Proposition 7. When firms only compete in fixed fee, both firms set the same con-
tract to both consumer types. The equilibrium fixed fee is
































Implication of the policy intervention
We can now compare the outcome of this intervention with the market outcome
when firms offer screening contracts to consumers (as described in Proposition 1).





16 + 8τ − 3τ2
16 + 8τ + 17τ2
,
where φπ∗SF < φΛ∗SF for each τ .
The following two propositions describe the effects of the intervention on firms and
consumers. The findings are also illustrated in the right panel of Figure 3.
Proposition 8. An abolishment of the linear price results in lower (higher) profits
for firms as long as the share of informed consumers is sufficiently low (high), i.e.,
π∗F < (>)π
∗
S for φ < (>)φπ∗SF (τ).
Proposition 8 says that, depending on the level of market transparency (as mea-
sured by the share of informed consumers) firms may lose or benefit from the inter-
20
vention. Indeed, this brings a more nuanced picture to the literature. The existing
literature shows that in markets with full consumer information reducing the num-
ber of price elements over which firms can compete is beneficial for firm profits
(Yin, 2004). In contrast, in our setting with informed and uninformed consumers
this finding may not necessarily hold. Indeed, if the share of uninformed consumers
is sufficiently large, profits fall due to the intervention. Hence, our model with im-
perfect consumer information is in line with mobile telecommunication firms’ op-
position to the recent EU ban of roaming charges.
The next proposition explores the welfare effects of the intervention:
Proposition 9. (i) Informed consumers never benefit from the abolishment of
the linear price component, i.e., Λ∗S,r > Λ∗F,r.
(ii) Uninformed consumers always benefit from the abolishment of the linear price
component, i.e., Λ∗S,n < Λ∗F,n.
(iii) Consumers as a whole benefit from (are worse off after) the abolishment as
long as the share of informed consumers is sufficiently small (large), i.e., Λ∗S <
(>)Λ∗F for φ > (<)φΛ∗SF .
The main message behind Proposition 9 is that, while overall consumer welfare can
go up or down, the effects on the two consumer groups are clear-cut. Uninformed
consumers benefit from the intervention, and informed consumers lose out. Thus,
the effects on overall consumer welfare largely depends on the distribution of types.
With a large number of informed consumers (φ > φπ∗SF (τ)), the effect is negative;
for φ < φπ∗SF (τ), the effect is positive. Here, we also complement existing findings
by showing that consumer information crucially matters to determine whether a
reduction of pricing instruments hurts or benefits consumers.
The left panel of Figure 3 provides the intuition of these findings. While both con-
sumer groups benefit from the reduction of the linear fee, all consumers are also
negatively affected via higher fixed fees (waterbed effect). Note, however, that this
waterbed effect appears stronger for uninformed consumers compared to informed
consumers. Nevertheless, we find that uninformed consumers can overall benefit
from the regulation when the decrease of the linear fee dominates. In contrast, in-
formed consumers never benefit, because the reduction of the linear fee is, as can
be seen in the figure, relatively small compared to the increase of the fixed fee.
Finally, note that the overall effects on social welfare are positive. As the intervention
sets the linear price equal to zero, it implements the efficient consumption level and,
hence, social welfare increases due to the intervention.
21
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(b) Impact on profits and consumer surplus.
Figure 3: Impact of a policy that bans linear prices.
Note: The area between the solid gray lines in the right panel represents those combinations
of the degree of transparency and transport costs considered in the analysis. For combina-
tions in section a, firms and consumers as a whole lose out due to the ban, whereas both
parties benefit from it in section c. In section b, firms benefit, but consumers are made worse
off.
6 Comparing policy interventions
In this section, we compare the two interventions, and identify conditions when
each is the better solution for a regulator to implement. One potential aim of a
regulator could be to maximize total consumer surplus. An alternative objective
could be to maximize the surplus of uninformed consumers (if they are seen as
vulnerable consumers). Interestingly, in both interventions, inter-group price dis-
crimination is removed so that the two objectives are aligned. Yet, it will turn out
that the preferences of the two consumer groups, informed and uninformed, are
not generally aligned. A final aim of this section is to explore the effects of a further
scenario in which a regulator – apart from affecting the price scheme – might also af-
fect consumer awareness of the linear price component, for instance, via disclosure
requirements.
Comparison of total consumer surplus and firm profits
We start by comparing preferences of firms and consumers as an aggregate group.
Proposition 10. Comparing the two scenarios of a policy intervention reveals that
(i) there exists a φπ∗(τ) such that π∗F (τ) < π∗T (φ, τ) for φ < φπ∗(τ), and π∗T (φ, τ) <
π∗F (τ) for φ > φπ∗(τ);
(ii) there exists a φΛ∗(τ) such that Λ∗T (φ, τ) < Λ∗F (τ) for φ < φΛ∗(τ), and Λ∗F (τ) <
Λ∗T (φ, τ) for φ > φΛ∗(τ); and
22
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Figure 4: Optimal policy intervention for consumers.
Note: The area between the solid gray lines represents those combinations of the degree of
transparency and transport costs considered in the analysis. For combinations in section a,
firms prefer two-part tariffs, whereas the regulator with a consumer standard prefers fixed
fees. In section b, firms and the regulator favor fixed fees. Firms prefer fixed fees, and the
regulator favors two-part tariffs in section c.
Figure 4 illustrates the findings of the proposition (parts (i) and (ii)). The intuition
behind these results can be related to our findings in Proposition 4. Consumers as a
whole are better off when linear prices are abolished as long as the share of informed
consumers is sufficiently low.13 This is illustrated by the areas a and b in Figure 4.
In this case, it is true that fixed fees would be lower under a single two-part tariff,
but firms can exploit the fact that many consumers are not aware of the charged
linear prices. As a result, a policy that bans this linear component maximizes total
consumer surplus.
In the opposite case in which a larger number of consumers is informed, the optimal
policy intervention would require firms to offer only a single two-part tariff (illus-
trated by area c in Figure 4). Because a larger number of consumers is informed, the
negative effect of a high fixed fee when the linear fee is banned dominates so that
consumers are better off with a (single) two-part tariff.
These findings for consumer welfare have important implications for firms: Firms’
and consumers’ preferences are generally not aligned, and we can conclude that,
despite the fact that more pricing instruments tend to result in more intense com-
13While in our model, the effect of this policy intervention on consumer surplus crucially depends
on the share of uninformed consumers in the population, this does not hold true for related models
of add-on pricing. In Ellison (2005), “[...] such a policy would make all consumers better off. High
types gain because they pay lower prices. Low types are better off despite paying more because they
get a higher quality good.”
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petition, firms benefit from being able to exploit uninformed consumers when their
share is large. In this situation, abolishing the linear fee boosts competition in fixed
fees to an extent such that profits decrease.
Interestingly, however, there is also an intermediate region for the scope of trans-
parency for which both, firms and consumers, benefit from the abolishment of the
linear price (area b in Figure 4). Compared to the case with no or only very little
market transparency, the linear price is lower, and, hence, social welfare is higher.
In this intermediate range, firms cannot appropriate all of this gain but only parts
of it due to competition. As a result, consumers also get a share of the gain.
Due to the positive linear price under two-part tariffs, social welfare is always higher
in the fixed-fee scenario (which implies a linear price equal to the marginal cost of
zero).
Differential effects on informed and uninformed consumers
As pointed out in the previous sections, we see that the interventions can have differ-
ent effects on informed and uninformed consumers. While uninformed consumers
benefit from both interventions, this is not the case for informed consumers. There-
fore, in this subsection, we provide more detail on the groups’ preferred pricing
regimes (including no intervention at all).
The results of these comparisons are presented in Table 1. In addition to the ef-
fect on the two consumer types, the table, drawing on Proposition 10, shows the
preferred pricing regimes for consumers as a whole and for firms. While the pref-
erences of consumers and uninformed consumers are aligned, these can differ for
informed consumers, in particular, in markets with a large number of uninformed
consumers. The comparison shows that for sufficiently opaque markets, informed
consumers prefer no intervention at all (that is, their surplus is maximized with
screening contracts), whereas uninformed consumers prefer an intervention (typi-
cally, fixed fees only).
Interestingly, in contrast to uninformed consumers, informed consumers never pre-
fer the ban of linear fees, because this makes it possible for firms to appropriate a
large share of their surplus via a high fixed fee (Yin, 2004). In contrast, such fixed-
fee-only contracts can be optimal for uninformed consumers, because uninformed
consumers cannot be exploited via unexpected high linear prices.
Additional policy measure: Disclosure of linear prices
So far, the distribution of consumer types (informed vs. uninformed) was treated
as an exogenous parameter. Here, we briefly discuss optimal policy decisions if a
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Table 1: Optimal regimes.
τ . 0.0798
0 ≤ φ < φπ∗SF φπ∗SF ≤ φ < φΛ∗FT φΛ∗FT ≤ φ < φΛ∗ST,r φΛ∗ST,r ≤ φ ≤ 1
Firms Screening Fixed fees Fixed fees Fixed fees
Consumer surplus Fixed fees Fixed fees Single TPT Single TPT
Informed consumers Screening Screening Screening Single TPT
Uninformed consumers Fixed fees Fixed fees Single TPT Single TPT
Total welfare Fixed fees Fixed fees Fixed fees Fixed fees
τ & 0.0798
φ < φΛ∗FT φΛ
∗
FT
≤ φ < φπ∗SF φπ∗SF ≤ φ < φΛ∗ST,r φΛ∗ST,r ≤ φ ≤ 1
Firms Screening Screening Fixed fees Fixed fees
Consumer surplus Fixed fees Single TPT Single TPT Single TPT
Informed consumers Screening Screening Screening Single TPT
Uninformed consumers Fixed fees Single TPT Single TPT Single TPT
Total welfare Fixed fees Fixed fees Fixed fees Fixed fees
regulator not only restricts firms’ pricing instruments, but can influence to what ex-
tent linear fees are salient, and can require firms to disclose and advertise the linear
price component. In our setting, such a disclosure requirement could be interpreted
as an increase in the share of informed consumers (and a corresponding decrease
in uninformed consumers).
To fix ideas suppose that a regulator applies a consumer standard, and intends to
maximize total consumer surplus. In addition to choosing the pricing regime, the
regulator can determine the share of informed consumers at no cost. Then, we ob-
tain the following result:
Proposition 11. A regulator that can choose the pricing regime and the level of
transparency will impose a single-part tariff, and will never require full transparency.
The intuition for understanding this finding comes in two steps. First, note that
with fixed fees only, the market outcome does not depend on the share of informed
consumers, while it does in the case of a single two-part tariff. Hence, because
the single-two part tariff is optimal for some level of transparency (see Proposi-
tion 10 and Table 1), fixed fees only can never be optimal if the regulator can also
choose transparency. Second, from Corollary 2 it immediately follows that full
transparency is never optimal. Thus, the regulator optimally prefers a regulation
with a single two-part tariff, and requires an intermediate level of transparency.
This result suggests that, instead of banning roaming charges, a policy that requires
firms to offer a single contract combined with an increased disclosure of roaming
charges might have led to higher aggregate consumer surplus. In particular, one
might argue that over time (in particular, due to increased use of data services)




Regarding roaming, our analysis suggest that given the small share of consumers
who are fully informed, the model can explain the divergence of interests in the
political decision process: Telecommunication firms were against the abolishment
of roaming fees, whereas the European Commission promoted it. Put differently,
because the model predicts that given that mobile operators opposed this kind of
policy intervention, this is evidence that only (very) few consumers were fully in-
formed about all pricing components. In this case, however, a regulatory interven-
tion is most warranted, because the difference in consumer surplus between the
two-part-tariff and the fixed-fee scenarios is greatest. However, our analysis also
suggests that the disclosure of roaming fees in combination with tariff simplifica-
tion might have resulted in even higher levels of consumer welfare.
The welfare results of our model in a market with boundedly rational consumers not
only provide a rationale for regulating the European telecommunications markets.
They also allow to conjecture that a large fraction of consumers are severely chal-
lenged by the complex pricing schemes that many products inhibit. Consequently,
following its consumer standard, it is consistent with our theory that the European
Commission continues to make a noticeable effort to support consumers in making
economically sound decisions.
In its most recent efforts to reduce pricing complexity, the European Commission
has put into effect the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID II). Apply-
ing from January 2018, this legislative framework is aimed at strengthening investor
protection in Europe – among other aspects by educating consumers about the often
complex pricing structures of financial products. Before consumers can buy or sell
stocks or funds, the regulation requires banks to supply them with standardized
information regarding the costs of transacting and holding these stocks.
Evidently, the pricing structures in the financial and telecommunications industries
differ substantially and applying our results to other markets would require to take
their peculiarities into account. As Faure and Luth (2011) argue, this quite gener-
ally applies to many findings of the behavioral literature in industrial organization
that to a large extent are context-specific and applicable only to particular products,
services, and consumer groups. This fact also suggests that there remains plenty of
scope for further market studies shedding light on the economic consequences of
consumers’ behavioral biases.
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Derivation of Assumption 1
In this appendix, we derive the transport costs thresholds which ensure that the
pure-strategy equilibria characterized for all three scenarios discussed in the main
text exist. The bounds on transport costs are necessary in the case of the upper
bound due to our requirement of full market coverage, in the case of the lower bound
to rule out deviations of firms to only serve one consumer group. We find that in
both cases the constraints implied by the single TPT case are binding.
Market coverage condition: Competition with screening contracts
The market is covered when both consumer groups have non-negative utility from
consumption. In the symmetric equilibrium the consumer with the lowest utility is









































Note that τ r < τn.
Market coverage condition: Competition in single two-part tariffs
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256(φ− 1)2(A− 3τ(φ+ 1) + 8φ+ 4)
≥ 0
(6)
The point where (6) binds with equality implicitly determines τ(φ). Graphical
inspection shows that min τ(φ) = τ(φ = 0) = 4/79(23 − 2
√
73) ≡ τ . Note that
τ < τ r.
Market coverage condition: Competition in fixed fee contracts
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Note that in the single two-part tariff scenario, firms may be able to profitably devi-
ate and serve only one of the consumer groups. In the screening case such a devia-
tion is never incentive-compatible for firms since offering two different contracts is
costless and therefore profit-maximizing. Moreover, in the fixed-fees only case a de-
viation to one of the two groups of consumers is impossible since their information
status coincides in this scenario.
In the following, we derive a lower bound on transport costs which ensures that
serving both types of consumers is indeed optimal. If transport costs are too low, a
firm can deviate by serving exclusively either informed or uninformed consumers.
Upon deviating to only serve the uninformed consumers, firm 1 maximizes:
max
p1,f1









(1− p1 − τx)dx+ f1x̂nT
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where x̂nT = 12 −
f1−f∗T
τ(2−τ) denotes the indifferent uninformed consumer with firm 1













(1− p1 − τx)dx+ f1x̂rT
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. We denote the prices under a deviation to
consumer type j ∈ {n, r} by {p∗D,j , f∗D,j} and the corresponding payoffs of the firm
by πD,j1 (p∗D,j , f∗D,j ; p∗T , f∗T ). Whenever deviating the firm will choose to deviate to
that group of consumers that promises her larger profits and we denote the firm’s
deviation payoffs as πD1 ≡ max{πD,n1 πD,r1 }. Since we study the fully symmetric equi-
librium we can drop the firm index in the following without any loss of generality
and treat firms synonymously.
Since numerical simulations show that the deviator obtains zero profits from the
group of consumers that is not targeted by the deviation, deviating by serving only
one group of consumers will not be profitable for a firm if and only if πD ≤ π∗T
holds. This condition can be reinterpreted as a lower bound on the transport cost
parameter, τ(φ), such that for all τ ≥ τ(φ) the deviation of a firm to serve only one
group of consumers is ruled out.
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